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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Social capital is a concept with a long history in the social sciences, and the subject
of a rapidly expanding literature in economics. In varying contexts, it has been shown to
aﬀect positively growth and development (Knack and Keefer 1997; Knack and Zak, 1999;
Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000; Grootaert and van Bastelear, 2002; Putnam, Leonardi and
Nanetti, 1993), institutional design and performance (Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003) and financial development (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales,
2004). In his seminal contribution, Putnam (1993) found a correlation between measures of
civic engagement and governmental quality across Italian regions. Similarly, Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2004) find a correlation between civic engagement and financial development,
again for Italy. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) find cross-country
correlation between a measure of trust and judicial eﬃciency (positive) and government
corruption (negative). But, despite the lavish attention to the concept, a precise definition has
remained elusive. One implication of the lack of conceptual clarity is that formal treatment
of social capital is sparse in the literature, with important exceptions of course; as a result
of both conceptual ambiguity and lack of formal analysis, empirical measurement has proved
diﬃcult (Durlauf, 2002). Our overall objective in this paper is to provide an analytical
framework of social capital, starting from a clear definition. This Introduction discusses the
concept in detail (sub-Section 1.2), related literature (1.3), our contribution (1.4) and the
structure of the paper (1.5).
1.2 What is ‘social capital’?
Landmark contributions in sociology such as Coleman (1990), Putnam (1993, 2000) and
Fukuyama (1997) place shared norms, beliefs and trust that facilitate economic (and wider)
activity and promote eﬃciency, at the heart of social capital. Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti
(1993), Bowles and Gintis (2002) and Routledge and von Amsberg (2002) define social capital
as the social or governance structures that facilitate cooperation. However, defining social
capital by its supposed eﬀect (cooperation) seems like putting the cart in front of the horses;
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a clear definition should go first, then the eﬀects investigated. Additionally, in some of these
analyses, social capital is a by-product of exchange, social interaction or other decision such
as location; there is no associated investment decision. Such a definition does not satisfy
Solow’s (1995) four essential criteria for a concept of capital: distinctiveness (particularly
from human capital), measurability (in principle), and clear process of accumulation and
depreciation.1
In a recent attempt to define the concept more precisely. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2012) define social capital as ‘. . . shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the
free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities.’ 2 While plausible, this appears
unduly restrictive: One may think of instances when a more general group of activities may
alleviate more ineﬃciently negative externalities than the free rider such as status-related
‘rat races’. In the same spirit, Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) suggest that: (a) social capital
generates positive externalities for members of a group; (b) these externalities are achieved
through shared trust, norms, and values and their consequent eﬀects on expectations and
behaviour; (c) shared trust, norms, and values arise from informal forms of organizations
based on social networks and associations. The first two aspects of this definition are virtually
identical to the Guiso et al. (2012) definition; requirement (c), however, appears a little
restrictive in that beneficial collective action, even informal and unintended, may happen in
the wider community, outside of such associations.3
A further point that requires clarification is the distinction between a pure social capital
and socially-related but privately-owned capital. Social capital is often defined in such a way
that it entails a private as well as a social benefit via various externalities. E.g., Glaeser,
Laibson and Sacerdote (2002, p. F439) define social capital as ‘social characteristics that
yield a market as well as non-market yield’; as they themselves acknowledge however, such
social skills (to use the everyday term) include those of ‘. . . the stereotypical used car salesman
who has lots of individual social capital (i.e., he’s good at selling lemons to naïve consumers),
but who generates little net social capital because of his negative social capital externalities’.
1Very useful surveys on social capital include Dasgupta (2003), Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) and Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales (2012).
2 ‘Civic capital’, in their terminology.
3Element (c) may in fact impart an element of circularity in so far as the defining characteristic of networks
is shared norms.
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Thus, this type of skill should more appropriately be considered as a socially-related, private
skill or form of human capital; social capital properly defined should be closer to what Glaeser
et al. (2002) call ‘aggregate’ social capital, which nets out all the externalities from individual
capital. Likewise, membership in an organization or network, a common definition of social
capital, that confers a private benefit and perhaps positive externalities among the group but
little on no wider social benefit, should also be excluded from a proper definition of social
capital for the same reasons.
In the light of the above, we propose that any definition should start from the words
themselves: social and capital: capital formed through costly (in an opportunity-cost sense)
investment, e.g., education; but it may well be intangible, such as shared norms, beliefs,
networks and institutions; and social, contributed to by many but not owned by anyone in
particular. A further point concerns the exact nature of the benefit that accrues at societal
level. Activities such as communal policing and cleaning of streets, while socially beneficial,
are arguably more in the nature of public services arising from voluntary contributions (of
time and/or eﬀort) rather than taxation. So, we define:
Definition:
‘Social capital is the set of all community-related formal and informal engagements, beliefs,
values, norms and practices that:
(a) help society achieve Pareto-superior outcomes, and
(b) require resources (time and/or eﬀort) to build.’
Examples may include contributions to charity, ethical behavior and norms such as po-
liteness and mutual help, environmentally friendly norms and practices, quality of governance
and institutions (Tabellini, 2008), etc. All these require investment such as formal and infor-
mal education and/or personal involvement and time. The beneficial eﬀects arise firstly from
the alleviation of ineﬃciencies related to status-seeking, conspicuous, corrupt or aggressive
behaviour, other rat races, free-riding, etc. Additionally, social capital may confer utility
directly: Helliwell, Aknin, Shiplett, Huang and Wang (2017) find that a higher social capital
is associated with a greater subjective well-being.4 Indeed, one may think of plausible reasons
4This is an eﬀect akin to the ’warm glow’ type of benefit from giving (Andreoni, 1990) except it it stems
from the level of social capital rather than the individual contribution to it.
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why there may be utility derived directly from social capital in the form of a lower crime
rate or greater social ties, mutual trust and cooperation, reducing monitoring costs, reducing
contractual costs and so on, in addition to the mitigation of the negative externalities.
1.3: Related literature
Due perhaps to conceptual ambiguity, existing formal treatment of the concept of social
capital is rather sparse. In an elegant early contribution, Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote
(2002) model the investment-into-social capital decision in an explicitly optimizing way; a
clear progress over earlier analyses. However, as alluded to above, their interface between
individual and social capital is problematic as they fail to incorporate the externalities. Ad-
ditionally, by relying on atomistic agents who take the aggregate social capital as exogenous,
they ignore the feedback eﬀect of optimal investment decisions regarding social capital made
by other individuals. Thus, they cannot incorporate the interpersonal complementaries across
individuals in accumulating social capital accumulation: The likelihood of my free riding in-
teracts with the extent of aggregate free riding.
Routledge and von Amsberg (2002) oﬀers a careful game-theoretic analysis of social
capital-as-cooperation; the problem with this approach has been mentioned above. In a
model where growth arises from productivity changes that require labor re-allocation, social
capital has welfare eﬀects. Without social capital, maximum growth arises from frictionless
re-allocation, yet this re-allocation will involve less likelihood of stable (repeated) trade re-
lationships and therefore cooperation is harder to sustain. Since social capital is defined as
the sustenance of cooperation, welfare may be higher with less labor mobility.
Without calling it social capital, Tabellini (2008) models the willingness to cooperate
which develops from the costly education by parents to their children in order for the latter
to acquire more cooperative values. This is a complementary approach to ours in that there
is ‘something’ that is sustained by costly investment and that helps society achieve more
eﬃcient outcomes; Tabellini (2008) calls it cooperation, we call it social capital. Varvarigos
and Xin (2015) also presents a formal framework which is however more narrowly focused
on the theme of trust.5 Closer to the spirit of our analysis, Chou (2006) presents a model in
which social capital facilitates standard human capital formation. Interestingly, this paper
5While trust may arguably be a component of social capital, it is characterised by reciprocity; thus, trust
is either shared widely or not. One may think of examples of social capital in such a way that one person may
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shows that there is a possibility of a poverty trap with little social capital and development.
Poverty traps is a wide-ranging theme in macroeconomics and growth where lots of avenues
have been explored but rather little convergence seemed to have been reached (see Azariadis
and Stachurski, 2005).
1.4: Our contribution
Guided by the above definition, we propose a novel formal framework to model social
capital as a community-related state variable, formed through costly investment, that alle-
viates the social ineﬃciencies associated with negative externalities. As explained below, we
advance the existing literature in several ways. In order to focus attention on social capital
without unnecessary complications, the model is a simple macro setup with flexible labor;
it is static except the evolution of social capital that induces dynamics. Analytically, in-
vestment in social capital relies on individual contributions of time; this time is costly in an
opportunity-cost sense and, implicitly, enhances social activities such as formal and informal
education. Social capital is also subject to gradual depreciation. Thus, it satisfies all of
Solow’s (1995) criteria. In a nutshell, social capital is an aggregate state variable that allevi-
ates unsociable/sub-optimal behavior. This is a novel treatment based on conceptual clarity;
as we show, it yields novel insights, thus satisfying the additional criterion of usefulness.
To capture ineﬃciencies, the utility function exhibits a status motive (alternatively known
as ‘keeping up with the Joneses’) that induces zero-sum behavior (see, e.g., among many oth-
ers: Alonso-Carrera, Caballé and Raurich, 2004; Alvarez-Cuadrado, Monteiro and Turnovsky,
2004; Futagami and Shibata,1998; Tsoukis, 2007; Tournemaine and Tsoukis, 2009). But the
emphasis on status is only for analytical convenience; very similar behavior and eﬀects in-
cludes corruption and aggression, ostentatious behavior, rat races, as well as free-riding. Our
framework is perfectly compatible with a wider interpretation, in which social capital restrains
individuals from any unsociable (i.e., ineﬃcient) behavior. In one version of our setup, we
allow for direct personal satisfaction from social capital as well as its eﬀects in alleviating
negative externalities, in line with the evidence in Helliwell et al. (2017).
Methodologically, our framework uses dynamic non-cooperative game theory and mod-
contribute to it while another may not, thus, reciprocity is not a necessary feature. In much of our analysis
below, we shall assumed symmetry, thus reciprocity is imposed.
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els the formation of social capital as a Markov Nash equilibrium. We believe we are the
first to model social capital as a state variable. This treatment of social capital clarifies
the relationship between aggregate private and social capital, a diﬃculty that plagued some
earlier work as discussed. We capture the dynamic strategic considerations among forward-
looking individuals. This allows us to incorporate the status-related externalities and also to
take into account the temptation to free-ride; crucial complementarities between individuals
are thereby captured. This is an improvement over previous optimizing analyses in that
the interface between the individual decision to contribute to social capital and aggregate
dynamics is made explicit. As such, our framework resolves the tension between the tradi-
tional individual-optimizing approach of economics and more sociological analyses that view
the community level as the appropriate decision-making unit for social capital (see Glaeser,
Laibson and Sacerdote, 2002).
We derive several results related to equilibrium labor, social capital and welfare in pris-
oner’s dilemma-type of situations with repeated interaction. We also contribute to poverty
traps by showing conditions under which economies get trapped in low social capital. Our
first specific result is that, in the case where social capital alleviates externalities but does
not confer direct utility of the ‘warm glow’ type, there exist (possibly, a continuum of) MPE
strategies which almost always causes overconsumption compared to the Pareto-eﬃcient con-
sumption level. Secondly, the most interesting result of this analysis, is that such overcon-
sumption inevitably leads social capital to zero. In this case, the society almost always fails to
accumulate social capital, and it stays in a poverty trap in the sense that the unchecked neg-
ative externalities cause net welfare to be low. In other words, a situation akin to a prisoners’
dilemma arises. This pessimistic result is lifted when (a necessary condition) social capital
enters directly individuals’ utility function. According to our third result, if the degree of the
disutility of labor takes intermediate values, getting out of a poverty trap is possible.
1.5: Structure of the paper
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the basic model,
and then characterizes the dynamics of the model. Section 3 conducts the same analysis
by extending the basic model to include peculiar benefits from social capital. Section 4
performs an analysis regarding welfare comparison between the command economy and the
decentralized economy. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion and suggestions for
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future research. Additional mathematical proofs will be given in Appendices A and B.
2 The Model
There are n (≥ 2) individuals. The instantaneous utility of individual i depends positively
on consumption, ci, and social status ci/c¯, where c¯ = (Σnj=1cj)/n represents average con-
sumption. The objective function of individual i is a discounted-sum of utilities over an
infinite-time horizon:
ui =
Z ∞
0
h
log ci − βli + (1− θi (S)) log
³ci
c¯
´i
e−ρtdt, ρ > 0, i = 1, 2, ..., n, (1)
where the function log (ci/c¯) captures the status externality, and β represents the weight on
the disutility arising from labor supply. Specification of the second term in (1) would capture
the fact the utility of each individual increases in the utility that the other individuals assign
to her or his achievement in excess of average.6 In addition, the variable θi (S) represents the
perception of social capital by individual i: θi (S) : R+ 7→ [0, 1]; that is, the extent to which
the status externality is internalized due to the spirit of social capital, and thus 1 − θi (S)
represents the weight put on status-seeking motive.
Individuals decide at each point in time how much they engage in social interaction as well
as how much to consume. Their choices are constrained by a time constraint. Consumption
is also constrained by income, which is earned from working at a wage rate w according to
the following flow budget constraint for individual i at each point in time:
ci = wli,
while the time constraint is given by
1 ≥ li + ai,
6Although it appears that larger S reduces the utility in (1), it is not a case because we will show that the
presence of status-seeking preferences leads individuals to overconsumption which in turn deteriorates their
well-being; however, the tendency of overconsumption which would be larger than the Pareto-eﬃcient level is
gradually weakened as a result of the accumulation of social capital, thereby generating positive externalities
on individual utility.
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where ai is the time allocated to social activities which contribute to accumulating the stock
of social capital over time and li is the amount of labor supply. For notational simplicity,
we assume not only that the relative price between private consumption and leisure (i.e., the
wage rate w), which is set equal to 1, but also that the time endowment is also normalized
to be one through time. As a result, combining both constraints yields
ci = 1− ai. (2)
The aggregate stock of social capital will continuously change over time according to
S˙ = S(Σni=1ai)− δS, (3)
where δ is a constant depreciation rate of social capital (0 < δ < 1). The emergence of S
in the production of social capital reflects the fact that the existing social capital stock has
spillover eﬀects on the building of social capital.
Each individual maximizes the intertemporal utility ui in (1) by selecting the time paths
of ci and ai subject to (2) and the given initial level of social capital, S0 (≥ 0), taking into
account the others’ strategies aj (j = 1, 2, ..., n : j 6= i). We define a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of this n-player diﬀerential game denoted by Γ(S0, 0) in the next subsection,
where S0 represents a historically given initial stock of social capital.
2.1 Solution Concept
We solve the diﬀerential game Γ(S0, 0) using the notion of a stationary Markov Perfect Equi-
librium (MPE), which is appealing because, in ruling out all direct strategic interactions, it
allows use of optimal control tools. To state this concept of equilibrium in a mathemati-
cally rigorous way, we reproduce a series of definitions given by Dockner et al. (2000) with
notational modifications:
Definition 1 (Dockner et al., 2000, Definition 3.1). A control path ci : [0,∞) 7→ R+ is
feasible for the game Γ(S0, 0) if the initial value problem defined by (1) − (3) has a unique,
absolutely continuous solution S(.) such that the constraints S(t) ∈ R+ and ci(t) ∈ [0, 1] hold
for all t and the integral in (1) is well defined.
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As the game Γ(S0, 0) is stationary, we can focus on equilibria supported by stationary
strategies. For analytical simplicity, we further restrict ourselves to stationary Markov strate-
gies throughout the paper.
Definition 2 (Dockner et al.,2000, p.97). A stationary Markov strategy is a mapping φi :
R+ 7→ [0, 1], so that the time path of the control is ci(t) = φi(S(t)).
Hence, stationary Markov strategies are functions only of the current state. Then we can
define:
Definition 3 The n-tuple of functions (φ1,φ2, ...,φn) is a stationary Markov Nash equilib-
rium if for each i ∈ {1, 2, .., n} an optimal control path ci(t) of the problem Γ(S0, 0) exists
and is given by the stationary Markov strategy ci(t) = φi(S(t)).
We use the further strengthening of Markov Nash equilibrium, that is, subgame perfect-
ness, to characterize an equilibrium path:
Definition 4 (Dockner et al., 2000, Definition 4.4). The n-tuple of functions (φ1,φ2, ...,φn)
is a Markov Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(S0, t). The Markov Nash equilibrium is Markov
perfect equilibrium (MPE) if for each (S, t) ∈ R+ × [0,∞), the subgame Γ(S, t) admits a
Markov Nash equilibrium (ψ1,ψ2, ...,ψn) such that ψi(Sˆ, s) = φi(Sˆ, s) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
and all (Sˆ, s) ∈ R+ × [t,∞).
Since the subgame Γ(S, t) is stationary, Γ(S, 0) = Γ(S, t) and thus all stationary Markov
Nash equilibria are MPE.
The model described above is a diﬀerential game in which each player’s strategies are its
consumption and social interaction (or labor supply), which is measured by the time devoted
to social activities, while the state variable of the game is the aggregate stock of social capital
S. Since we focus on the (stationary) Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) defined above, we
assume that each agent’s strategies, ci and ai, are functions of the current stock level of
aggregate social capital, S, alone. This means that the value function of the i-th agent’s
optimization problem at time t can be written as
Vi (St) ≡ max
Z ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)ui (ci(τ), li(τ), St) dτ . (4)
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We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: The value function of individual i, Vi (S) = max{ci(.), li(.)} J
i
φ−i(ci(.), li(.)):
R+ → R, is locally Lipschitz continuous.
2.2 Candidate Markov Perfect Equilibrium Strategies
The value function (4), after substitution of li = ci in (1), satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation such as
ρVi (S) = max{ci}
½
log ci − βci + (1− θi (S)) log
µ
ci
C/n
¶
+ V 0i (S)
£
SΣnj=1 (1− cj)− δS
¤¾
(5)
for all t ≥ 0, where C ≡ Σnj=1cj . In solving the maximization problem defined in the right-
hand-side of (5) at each moment in time, the i-th individual takes the other players’ strategies,
{cj}j 6=i (j = 1, 2, .., n) , as given. The first-order conditions for i’s choice of consumption are
given by
1
ci
− β + (1− θi (S)) 1
ci/C
Σnj=1, j 6=icj
C2
− V 0i (S)S
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
= 0 =⇒ ci ∈ (0, 1] ,
> 0 =⇒ ci = 1,
(6)
or equivalently,
ci(S) =
1 + (1− θi (S))
³
Σnj=1, j 6=icj/C
´
β + V 0 (S)S . (7)
According to (6), each individual, when choosing ci, trades the marginal utility gains from an
increase in current consumption and the associated status-seeking consumption against the
sum of the utility loss from increased labor supply and the marginal loss in the discounted
value of the future stream of positive externalities arising from the social capital stock in such
a way that the accumulation of social capital stock prevents from excessive consumption. If
the marginal utility from an increase in current consumption is larger than the payoﬀ loss im-
plied by the decrease in ai for all levels of ci ∈ (0, 1], then i will rationally devote all resources
to consumption. However, i never chooses ci = 0 due to the property of logarithm utility
functions. Moreover, close inspection of (6) reveals the following features; The higher the
disutility of labor (i.e., β), the lower the labor supply; consequently, instantaneous consump-
tion immediately falls through the budget constraint (2), while instantaneous consumption is
also stimulated by the presence of status-seeking competition which is captured by the term
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Σnj=1, j 6=icj/C; The accumulation of social capital diminishes the positive externality of rela-
tive consumption on its own consumption, which is captured by 1 − θS, thereby depressing
consumption, while it generates the intertemporal externality captured by the term V 0 (S)S,
which may increase or decrease consumption depending on the sign of V 0 (S).
To get a closed-form solution, we have to impose a special form on the function θi (S)
such as
θi (S) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
θiS if S < S¯i,
1 if S¯i ≤ S,
(8)
where S¯i = 1/θi. We call S¯i “a satiation level of the social capital stock” perceived by
individual i.
Equation (6) gives the MPE solutions which are expressed as {ci (S)} for i = 1.2., ..., n.
Substituting these optimal solutions back into the HJB equation (5) associated with agent i,
together with (8), we obtain
ρVi (S) = log ci (S)− βci (S) + (1− θiS) log
µ
ci (S)
C (S) /n
¶
+ V 0i (S)
£
SΣnj=1(1− cj (S))− δS
¤
.
(9)
By the use of the envelop theorem, we find that diﬀerentiating both sides of (9) with respect
to S gives
ρV 0i (S) = c
0
i (S)
ci (S)
− βc0i(S)− θi log
µ
nci (S)
C (S)
¶
+ (1− θiS) ·
C (S)
ci (S)
c0i (S)C (S)− ci (S)Σnj=1c0j (S)
[C (S)]2
+ V
00
i (S)
£
SΣnj=1(1− cj (S))− δS
¤
+V
0
i (S)
£Σnj=1(1− cj (S)) + SΣnj=1 ¡−c0j (S)¢− δ¤ . (10)
Since we have started our analysis assuming identical individuals and since the state equa-
tion (3) is symmetric with respect to their controls, a natural focus is placed on symmetric
equilibria. The symmetry assumption allows us to drop the subscript i in the subsequent
discussion, and we will suppress this index unless strictly necessary for expositional clarity.
Since under the assumption of symmetry log (C (S) /nc (S)) = 0 (recalling C (S) = nc (S))
and c0 (S)nc (S)− c (S)nc0 (S) = 0, we obtain
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ρV 0 (S) =
∙
1
c (S)
− β
¸
c0 (S) + V 00 (S) [Sn(1− c (S))− δS]
+V 0 (S)
£
n(1− c (S))− Snc0 (S)− δ¤ . (11)
After the tedious manipulation, we can rewrite (11) as follows (see Appendix A):
c0 (S) = − 1
S
·
ρ
∙
1− βc (S) + (1− θS) n− 1
n
¸
+ θn− 1
n
S [n(1− c (S))− δ]
1
c(S)
[(n− c(S))− δ]
∙
1− βc (S) + (1− θS) n− 1
n
¸
+ (1− θS) n− 1
n
+ β [n(1− c (S))− δ]
.
(12)
2.3 Dynamics and Steady State
We will draw the representatives of Markov strategies in a control and state space in order
to characterize qualitative solutions to the nonlinear diﬀerential equation (12). The solutions
satisfying (12) are only candidates and, in some cases, many of them do not qualify for a
MPE. Those solutions must pass further tests to qualify for a MPE satisfying the properties
stated later. To stress the candidate status, we introduce an additional notation, φ (S),
instead of c (S). Let us first denote by C2 the loci where φ0 (S) goes to plus/minus infinity,
and by C3 the loci where φ0 (S) equals zero in the (S, c) space:
C1 := {(S, c) : S˙ = Sn(1− φ (S))− δS = 0},
C2 := {(S, c) : φ0 (S)→ ±∞}, (13)
C3 := {(S, c) : φ0 (S) = 0}.
First, we can obtain the steady state locus C1 by setting S˙ = 0; that is,
c = 1− δ
n
, (14)
which implies that the steady-state locus C1, denoted by S˙ = 0 in Fig. 1, is a horizontal
line at c = 1 − (δ/n) in the (S, c) space. The arrows illustrated in Fig. 1 indicate that for
initial values of φ(S) above the steady state locus, c = 1 − (δ/n), the social capital stock is
declining in time, while for those of φ(S) below the steady state locus the social capital stock
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Figure 1: Steady state locus
is increasing in time. It is also important to note that there is an upper bound on S (i.e.,
S ≤ (1/θ)), as illustrated by the dotted vertical straight line at 1/θ in Fig. 1.7 Beyond this
upper bound, there is no incentive for every individual to accumulate more social capital,
because further social capital accumulation reduces utility.
Next, by setting the denominator in (12) equal to zero, we can obtain the locus of the
curve C2:
1
c
[(n− c)− δ]
∙
1− βc+ (1− θS) n− 1
n
¸
+ (1− θS) n− 1
n
+ β [n(1− c)− δ] = 0, (15)
which we call “the non-invertibility locus” following Rowat (2007). After some manipulation,
we can rewrite (15) as follows:
βc2 (1− n)− c+ (n− δ)
∙
1 + (1− θS) n− 1
n
¸
= 0, (16)
whose solutions for c are given by c ≥ 0:
c =
s
1 + 4β (n− 1) (n− δ)
∙
1 + (1− θS) n− 1
n
¸
− 1
2β (n− 1) , (17)
7Since we have made the assumption of symmetry, the satiation levels of the social capital capital perceived
by all individuals are common among them, so that S¯i = S¯ for ∀i.
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which entails that
lim
S−→0c =
r
1 + 4β (n− 1) (n− δ) 2n− 1
n
− 1
2β (n− 1) R 1, and (18)
lim
S−→1/θc =
p
1 + 4β (n− 1) (n− δ)− 1
2β (n− 1) > 0.
An important point is to be noticed that if the solution curve of φ(S) crosses the curve C2,
it becomes discontinuous at this intersection point; consequently, it is ruled out as a solution
(see the next subsection in further details).
Inspection of (17) further reveals not only that the curve C2 may cross the vertical axis
above or below the budget line c = 1 becauser
1 + 4β (n− 1) (n− δ) 2n− 1
n
− 1
2β (n− 1) − 1 R 0 if and only if β Q
(n− δ)(2n− 1)− n
n(n− 1) , (19)
but also that the curve C2 may cross the vertical axis above or below the steady state line
1− (δ/n) becauser
1 + 4β (n− 1) (n− δ) 2n− 1
n
− 1
2β (n− 1) −
µ
1− δ
n
¶
R 0 if and only if β Q 2n
n− δ . (20)
It can also be verified that the curve C2 always crosses the upper boundary S = 1/θ below
the budget line c = 1 because
p
1 + 4β (n− 1) (n− δ)− 1
2β (n− 1) − 1 < 0, (21)
while the curve C2 may cross the upper boundary S¯ = 1/θ below or above the steady state
line 1− (δ/n) becausep
1 + 4β (n− 1) (n− δ)− 1
2β (n− 1) −
µ
1− δ
n
¶
R 0 if and only if β Q n
n− δ . (22)
Taking into account of (19), (20), (21) and (22) in conjunction with the following facts:
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(n− δ)(2n− 1)− n
n(n− 1) −
n
n− δ =
n3 − 4n2δ − n2 + 2nδ2 + 3nδ − δ2
n(n− 1) (n− δ) R 0,
(n− δ)(2n− 1)− n
n(n− 1) −
2n
n− δ =
−δ ¡δ − 3n+ 4n2 − 2nδ¢
n(n− 1) (n− δ) < 0,
n
n− δ −
2n
n− δ < 0, and
2n− 1
n
− n
n− δ =
n2 − (2δ + 1)n+ δ
(n− δ)n R 0,
we can draw several geometric representations for the curve C2 such as Figs. 2 − 8, corre-
sponding to various parameter values of n, β and δ.
On the other hand, the locus C3 is obtained by setting the numerator in (12) equal to
zero. Solving it for c gives the following locus:
c =
(n− δ − ρ) θn− 1
n
S + ρ2n− 1
n
ρβ + θ (n− 1)S , (23)
with
lim
S→0c =
2n− 1
βn , limS−→∞c = (n− δ − ρ)
1
n
< 1, and lim
S−→ −ρβθ(n−1)
c =∞.
Taken together, it turns out that the nonlinear curve C3 is an orthogonal hyperbolic curve
in the (S, c) space which intersects with the vertical axis at
2n− 1
βn , as illustrated in Figs.
2− 8. Note, moreover, that the intercept of the curve C3 lies above (below) the intercept of
the budget line c = 1 on the vertical axis if β < 2n− 1
n
( β > 2n− 1
n
) because
2n− 1
βn − 1 =
(2− β)n− 1
βn R 0 if and only if β Q
2n− 1
n
,
while the curve C3 crosses the vertical axis below (above) the steady state line (i.e., , c = 1− δ
n
)
if β > 2n− 1
n− δ (β <
2n− 1
n− δ ) because
2n− 1
βn −
µ
1− δ
n
¶
=
2n− nβ + βδ − 1
βn R 0 if and only if β Q
2n− 1
n− δ .
Lastly, the curve C3 crosses the line 1/θ above (below) the steady sate line if β < n
n− δµ
β > n
n− δ
¶
, because
(n− δ − ρ) n− 1
n
+ ρ2n− 1
n
ρβ + (n− 1) −
µ
1− δ
n
¶
= ρ −(n− δ)β + n
[ρβ + (n− 1)]n R 0 if and only if β Q
n
n− δ .
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Collecting the arguments discussed so far, we draw several geometric representations for
the curves C2 and C3, depending on the combinations of various parameter values of β, n and
δ. Two remarks are made in order. First, based on the information regarding signs of (12)
which are determined according to the respective regions divided by the curves C2 and C3,
together with the signs indicated by Fig.1, we can construct several phase diagrams indicating
how the variables c and S move as illustrated in Figs 2− 8.8 Second, it is important to note
that not all strategies satisfying (12), which are drawn in these figures, are solution curves.
In the next subsection, we will provide further conditions to pin down the MPE strategies
characterizing optimal consumption paths.
2.4 Refining Candidate Strategies
Unfortunately, not all interior strategies satisfying the HJB equation (5) are qualified as MPE
strategies defined in Definition 4. Dockner et al. (2000) have provided suﬃciency conditions
for the existence of MPE. So we have to test whether those candidate strategies satisfy the
suﬃciency conditions in Theorem 4.1 of Dockner et al. (2000).
The solution paths must satisfy the following three requirements: The first requirement
is that the strategies must be defined over the entire feasible state space (i.e., S ∈ [0, 1/θ]
in the present model) and not only for its subset. Rowat (2006) claims that we have to take
the definition of subgame perfection seriously, as long as we cannot explain how an initial
8At this point, it may be worthy pointing out whether the intercept of curve C2 may be greater or less
than that of curve C3. To identify this, we take the diﬀerence of their intercepts to yields

1 + 4β (n− 1) (n− δ) 2n− 1
n
− 1
2β (n− 1) −
2n− 1
βn
=

1 + 4β (n− 1) (n− δ) 2n− 1
n
− 1− 2 (2n− 1)

1− 1
n

2β (n− 1) ,
whose numerator can be manipulated by squaring both sides of the above expression to yield:
1 + 4β (n− 1) (n− δ) 2n− 1
n
−

1 + 2 (2n− 1)

1− 1
n
2
=
4 (2n− 1) 1
n
(n− 1)

β (n− δ)−

2n− 2 + 1
n

R 0 if β R 2(n− 1) + (1/n)
n− δ n.
The above result implies that as long as β > 2(n−1)+(1/n)
n−δ , the intercept of the curve C2 is greater than that
of the curve C3; otherwise, the opposite holds.
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condition of the state variable was reached in the first place. To show how this requirement
is used to refine candidate strategies, let us take up Fig. 2, which displays representatives of
those integral curves that are categorized into three typical types of the families of strategies
designated by the integral curves φj , j = 1, 2, and φ∗. The arrows attached those integral
curves indicate the evolution of S over time. Applying the first requirement, the family of
strategies φ2 can be ruled out, because those interior solutions do not cover the whole range
of S as seen in Fig. 2. Nevertheless, it may be possible to extend the families of those
strategies by patching with the corner strategy φ = 1 to the entire domain of S when those
strategies hit the boundary c = 1, as Rowat (2004) did. To check this possibility, consider a
case where the candidate interior strategy hits the boundary line c = 1. We can show that
the resulting patched strategy could cover the entire domain of the state variable S, only if
the interior strategy φ∗ is connected with the corner strategy φ = 1 at the points lying within
the appropriate range indicated by the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The corner strategy φ = 1 is not a MPE strategy if the value function (B.2) (see
Appendix B) possesses a non-zero constant of integration and satisfies φ(0) = 1. The corner
strategy φ = 1 is a MPE strategy if the value function (B.2) possesses a zero constant of
integration and the domain of the state variable S is given by
∙
0,
1
θ
µ
1− n(β − 1)
(n− 1)
¶¸
.
The proof is relegated to Appendix B. With the aide of this lemma, we are able to identify
which interior strategy φ∗ can or cannot be patched with the corner strategy φ = 1, when
that interior strategy hits the boundary line c = 1. However, note that the range indicated by
Lemma 1 is valid only when β < (2n−1)/n; otherwise, the extreme right end of that interval,
1
θ
µ
1− n(β − 1)
(n− 1)
¶
, is negative. Making use of this result, we can easily see that condition
β < (2n− 1)/n is not satisfied in all figures except for Fig.6. As a result, the corner solution
φ = 1 is ruled out and hence the patched solution is not possible in those figures.9 On the
other hand, it follows from (6) that as long as limS→0 V 0 (S) ≥ 0,
c(S)|S=0 =
2n− 1
n
β + limS→0 [V 0 (S)S] ≤ 1 if β ≥
2n− 1
n
. (24)
Since it is seen that condition (2n− 1) /n ≤ β holds in all figures except for Fig.6, c(S) < 1
for S ∈ (0, 1/θ] as long as limS→0 V 0 (S) ≥ 0.
9Note also that there is no MPE strategy in Fig.6 as shown later.
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The second requirement is that the strategies should be continuous over the entire
range of a state variable, i.e., S ∈ [0, 1/θ]. More specifically, when the strategies cross the
non-invertible curve C2, they ceases to be continuous at that crossing point, and thus such
strategies should be eliminated as an equilibrium solution. For this reason, the strategies φ2
in Fig. 2 are once again disqualified as MPE ones.
The third requirement is that the value function associated with the solution should
be bounded. This condition is clearly met for the candidate strategies because they either
reach zero or a bounded value of social capital stock together with the specification of the
objective function (1). In this view, although it appears that the families of the strategy
φ1 are MPE ones in Fig. 2, they are not. The reason is as follows. When the optimal
strategy φ1 reaches the satiated locus 1/θ, it has to stay at that hitting point on that locus
by freely disposing of the extra resource which has not been consumed, because further social
capital accumulation more than S = 1/θ is to reduce individual’s utility. However, this is
a suboptimal choice for every individual because the individuals can augment their utility
by increasing their consumption levels rather than disposing of that extra resource. Such a
choice causes their consumption levels to immediately jump to the steady state consumption
level, i.e., c = 1− (δ/n). Unfortunately, such a jumping solution entails discontinuity at that
point thus violating the second requirement. Alternatively, we may say that the strategy φ1
is no longer qualified as the MPE strategy, because each individual who adopts the strategy
φ1 has an incentive of deviating from this strategy. Taken together, we can conclude that the
families of the strategies φ1 as well as φ2 are not equilibrium strategies in Fig. 2. The same
argument applies to the strategies φ1 as well as φ2 appearing in other figures.
In spite of these requirements, there may still be multiple solution curves because there
may be a continuum of the interior strategies located slightly above the strategy φ∗ can reach
the vertical axis without touching or crossing the curve C2 as well as the budget constraint
c = 1 during the transition path to zero social capital in Figs. 2, 3 and 8. In contrast, there
are cases which do not allow for the existence of any MPE solution at all as illustrated in Figs.
4, 6 and 7, because the curve C2 prevents any interior strategy from reaching the vertical
axis.
Taken together, the results are summarized as follows:
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Proposition 5 Consider the diﬀerential game Γ(Z0, 0) and assume limS→0 V 0 (S) ≥ 0:
Either if β ≥ max
½
(n− δ)(2n− 1)− n
n(n− 1) ,
n
n− δ ,
2n− 1
n
¾
or
if
n
n− δ ≥ β ≥ max
½
(n− δ)(2n− 1)− n
n(n− 1) ,
2n− 1
n
¾
,
then there may exist a multiple (a continuum) of MPE strategies. The solution paths cor-
responding to those MPE strategies lead a social capital stock to decline to nil, while the associ-
ated consumption levels monotonically rise through time.
As to Proposition 1, there are several remarks in order. First, Proposition 1 implies that
there may be multiple MPE strategies unless “the non-invertibility locus” C2 prevents the
solution path from reaching the vertical axis. More precisely, if “the non-invertibility locus”
C2 crosses not only the vertical axis above the boundary line c = 1 but also the satiated
locus S = 1/θ below the steady state line as illustrated in Figs. 4, 6 and 7, there is no MPE
strategy. The potential existence of multiple MPE solutions would be consistent with the
results of Itaya and Shimomura (1993), and Rubio and Casino (2002) which also provides
multiplicity of equilibrium strategies as well as the uncountable many long run equilibria
associated with those multiple nonlinear MPE strategies. This similarity between them stems
from the boundedness of the entire space of a state variable imposed by the satiated level of
social capital together with the lack of the transversality condition.
Second, the optimal consumption paths associated with those MPE strategies all display
a downward sloping in the level of social capital stock. This property obviously reflects the
fact that larger stocks of social capital tend to deter excessive consumption which is induced
by status-seeking preferences enhanced by status-seeking competition in our setting.
Third, most impotently, all figures indicate that any consumption level supported by the
MPE strategy (except for the consumption level at the steady state) is always greater than
the steady state one, so that the accumulation of social capital never takes place, irrespective
of the size of an initial social capital stock. In other words, all of the MPE strategies always
lead the social capital stock to decline to nil; consequently, either if there were initially a small
amount of social capital stock in social capital-poor societies or if there were initially a sizable
amount of social capital in social capital-rich societies but it is less than the satiated level
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(= 1/θ), overconsumption driven by status-seeking preferences enhanced by its competition
inevitably prevails, so that it eventually vanishes in the long run. As a consequence, the
society by itself is unable to escape from a social capital-poverty trap. We may also say
that such social capital-poor societies are captured in a poverty trap when status-seeking
preferences are present. The reason for this pessimistic result is simply that those negative
externalities are strong enough to overweigh the positive externality arising from social capital
accumulation.10
In such a situation, government intervention should be called upon to help the societies
escape from such a poverty trap. Since the society by itself can never spontaneously and
autonomously accumulate social capital, governments and/or outside authorities have to en-
force or regulate the members of the society to accumulate more social capital up to the
satiated level by curtailing individual consumption. Put diﬀerently, in the societies where
status-seeking preferences are commonly observed, the government must play a very active
role in a way that corrects or regulates the behavior of rational and forward-looking indi-
viduals to large extent so as to curtail their consumption levels through time which leads
to the satiated steady state level. Alternatively, the government may implement “a capital
big push” in a way of immediately building up the satiated level instantaneously or initially
before social capital starts accumulating.
Fourth, the main cause for the above-mentioned “Tragedy of the Commons” is that the
incentive to accumulate social capital is too weak. To induce individuals to promote social
capital accumulation, we need to introduce individual’s pleasure or peculiar benefits from
social capital in addition to voluntarily restraining overconsumption caused by the presence
of social-status preferences enhanced by social-status competition. This may correspond to
the warm-glow motivation in the model of voluntary provision of public goods (see, e.g.,
10Social capital poverty trap also has been captured by Chou (2006) in the endogenous growth model with
the Romer (1990)’s R&D function augmented with social capital spillover. He shows that if the spillover eﬀect
on one person’s decision to accumulate social capital varies with the level of social capital in the community,
such an economy has two possible steady states: one of which is a stable social capital-poor equilibrium and
the other of which is an unstable social caipital-rich equilibrium and calls the first equilibrium a social capital
poverty trap. However, the emergence of a poverty trap stems from a non-concave reduced-form function of
social capital which implicitly embodies the social capital spillover. In contrast, our model has microeconomic
foundations which explain how the spillover eﬀect of social capital operate across individuals.
20
Figure 2: β ≥ 2n
n− δ
Andreoni, 1990) which also enhances an incentive of donors to supply public goods. We
extend the present model to include some sort of peculiar benefits from social capital stock
in Section 3.
3 Peculiar Benefits from Social Capital
In this section, we incorporate the benefit from social capital, which enhances the incentive
of individuals to accumulate social capital. To do this, we modify the intertemporal utility
function such as:
ui =
Z ∞
0
h
log ci − βli + γS + (1− θi (S)) log
³ci
c¯
´i
e−ρtdt, ρ > 0, i = 1, 2, ..., n, (25)
where the parameter γ represents the strength of preferences towards social capital, while the
rest of the model is the same as before. The presence of social capital in the utility function
may be viewed as the quality of social environment which depends on accumulated social
capital (see, e.g., Antoci, et al., 2014).11 The function, after substitution of li = ci in (25),
11Alternatively, we may assume that individuals have preferences for socializing. In this formulation, the
choice variable of ai directly enters the utility function instead of the state variable S. Although this modifi-
cation does not alter our results essentially, the analysis becomes extremely complicated.
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Figure 3:
2n
n− δ ≥ β ≥ max
½
2n− 1
n− δ ,
(n− δ) (2n− 1)− n
n (n− 1)
¾
Figure 4:
(n− δ) (2n− 1)− n
n (n− 1) ≥ β ≥
2n− 1
n− δ
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Figure 5:
2n− 1
n− δ ≥ β ≥ max
½
(n− δ) (2n− 1)− n
n (n− 1) ,
2n− 1
n
,
n
n− δ
¾
Figure 6: min
½
2n− 1
n
,
(n− δ) (2n− 1)− n
n (n− 1)
¾
≥ β ≥ n
n− δ
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Figure 7:
(n− δ)(2n− 1)− n
n(n− 1) ≥ β ≥ max
½
2n− 1
n
,
n
n− δ
¾
Figure 8:
n
n− δ ≥ β ≥ max
½
2n− 1
n
,
(n− δ)(2n− 1)− n
n(n− 1)
¾
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the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is rewritten as:
ρVi (S) = max{ci}
½
log ci − βci + γS + (1− θi (S)) log
µ
ci
C/n
¶
+ V 0i (S)
£
S(Σnj=1 (1− cj)− δS
¤¾
(26)
for all t ≥ 0. The first-order conditions for i’s choice of consumption are the same as before.
Substituting these optimal solutions (i.e., as {ci (S)} for i = 1, 2., ..., n) back into the HJB
equation (26) associated with agent i, together with (8), we obtain
ρVi (S) = log ci (S)−βci (S)+γS+(1− θiS) log
µ
ci (S)
C (S) /n
¶
+V 0i (S)
£
SΣnj=1(1− cj (S))− δS
¤
.
(27)
By the use of the envelop theorem and focusing on symmetric equilibria, we can finally obtain
c0 (S) = − 1
S
·
ρ
∙
1− βc (S) + (1− θS) n− 1
n
¸
+ θn− 1
n
S [n(1− c (S))− δ]− γ
1
c(S)
[(n− c(S))− δ]
∙
1− βc (S) + (1− θS) n− 1
n
¸
+ (1− θS) n− 1
n
+ β [n(1− c (S))− δ]
.
(28)
In view of (28), it turns out that the curves C1 and C2 are the same as before, the only
curve C3 is slightly diﬀerent from the one in (23). Setting the numerator in (28) equal to
zero, we can get a new expression for the curve C3:
c =
(n− δ − ρ) θn− 1
n
S + ρ2n− 1
n
− γ
ρβ + θ (n− 1)S , (29)
with
lim
S→0c =
ρ2n− 1
n
− γ
ρβ , limS−→∞c = (n− δ − ρ)
1
n
< 1, and lim
S−→ −ρβθ(n−1)
c =∞.
Taken together, it turns out that the curve C3 is an orthogonal hyperbolic curve in the (S, c)
space which approaches the vertical line S = ρβ/θ (n− 1). The most important diﬀerence is
that the curve C3 crosses the line 1/θ below the steady sate line if β > n− (γ/ρ)
n− δ , because
(n− δ − ρ) n− 1
n
+ ρ2n− 1
n
− γ
ρβ + (n− 1) −
µ
1− δ
n
¶
=
1
n
ρ [n− (n− δ)β]− γ
ρβ + (n− 1) Q 0
if and only if β R n− (γ/ρ)
n− δ .
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Collecting the arguments discussed so far, we can draw Fig. 9. It follows from the above
condition that if
n
n− δ ≥ β ≥
n− (γ/ρ)
n− δ , the curve C2 will be located above the steady state
line at S = 1/θ, while the curve C3 is located below the steady state line at S = 1/θ, as
illustrated in Fig. 9. As a result, therefore, the presence of the peculiar preferences towards
social capital shifts the curve C3 downwards, so that the satiated steady state point E will end
up being in between these two curves at S = 1/θ. This feature makes it possible that there
is the unique optimal consumption path supported by the MPE strategy φ∗ drawn in Fig. 9.
Along this MPE solution curve, social capital can spontaneously and automatically reach the
satiated steady state point E. In particular, it should be stressed that only when the degree
of disutility (i.e.. β) should take intermediate values such as β ∈
∙
n
n− δ ,
n− (γ/ρ)
n− δ
¸
, there
exists the unique optimal consumption path supported by the MPE strategy which converges
to the satiated steady state level of consumption; see Fig.9. This feature can be explained as
follows: excessively higher values of β induce the individuals to deter consumption which in
turn gives rise to overaccumulation of social capital thus preventing from reaching the steady
state level of consumption corresponding to point E; conversely, excessively lower values of β
stimulate individual’s consumption too much which in turn gives rise to underaccumulation
of social capital thereby leading to zero social capital. Note also that consumption does not
change monotonically through time. More precisely, as shown in Fig.9, there is an unstable
steady state equilibrium in which consumption monotonically rises as social capital declines
to zero when the initial stock of social capital is less than SE, while consumption falls and
then rises to its steady state level as social capital increases to its satiated level when the
initial stock of social capital is greater than SE. It is important to note not only that there
will be multiple MPE strategies that lead social capital to zero, but also that larger values
of γ (i.e., the social capital stock becomes more attractive) or lower values of ρ allow for a
wider range of values of β so as to satisfy the range of n
n− δ ≥ β ≥
n− (γ/ρ)
n− δ , whereby
improving the likelihood of the existence of MPE strategies. Lower values of ρ imply that
the individual becomes more patient and thus more cooperative to sustain the unique MPE
strategy thereby making it possible to escape from a social capital poverty trap.
26
Figure 9:
n
n− δ ≥ β ≥
n− (γ/ρ)
n− δ
4 Welfare Comparison
In this section, we first compare between social welfare in a hypothetical planner’s economy
and in a decentralized economy in which social capital is accumulated through voluntary
eﬀort (social activity) made by individuals through time.
First, in the planner’s economy, the government is able to attain the first-best resource
allocation by directly controlling resource allocations in order to fully internalize a negative
externality arising from the aspire for relative consumption. The planner’s economy is able
to make the eﬃcient use of all the available instruments so as to completely eliminating
the externality associated with status-seeking competition and thus restore the first-best
allocation. This amounts to maximizing the following utility function over an infinite horizon:
ui =
Z ∞
0
[log ci − βli] e−ρtdt, (30)
subject to ci = li, whose optimal solution is given by cP = 1/β. Note that the the Pareto
eﬃcient consumption level is constant in the model without peculiar preferences towards
social capital.
We compare between the Pareto-eﬃcient level of consumption (= 1/β) and the consump-
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tion level realized in the decentralized economy. To this end, we first consider a case where
1
β < 1−
δ
n
,
which can be rewritten as
β > n
n− δ .
This condition holds true in Figs. 2− 7. Moreover, Figs. 2− 7 show that the consumption
levels associated with the optimal strategy φ∗, including (possibly a continuum of) other
optimal strategies, in the decentralized economy are always larger than the Pareto-eﬃcient
one (= 1/β); that is, overconsumption always occurs during the transition path as well as in
the long-run equilibrium (i.e., S = 0).
Conversely, if the opposite inequality holds; that is, β < n/(n− δ), it holds true in Fig. 8
alone. As illustrated in Fig.8, the long-run consumption supported by the MPE strategy φ∗
(i.e., S = 0) in the decentralized economy should be realized within the range of
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
r
1 + 4β (n− 1) (n− δ) 2n− 1
n
− 1
2β (n− 1) , 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
whose left-end point is given by the intersection of the non-invertible curve C2 with the
vertical axis; otherwise, the MPE strategy φ∗ will cross the curve C2. We compare the
minimum long-run consumption level with the Pareto-eﬃcient one (= 1/β) thus yieldingr
1 + 4β (n− 1) (n− δ) 2n− 1
n
− 1
2β (n− 1) −
1
β > 0 for β ∈
∙
n2
(n− δ)(2n− 1) ,
n
n− δ
¸
,
which reveals that the long-run consumption (corresponding to S = 0) supported by the
strategy φ∗ (including other optimal strategies) in the decentralized economy is also greater
than the Pareto eﬃcient level in Fig.8. Note, however, that when the strategy φ∗ starts from
initial values of S close to 1−(δ/n), earlier consumption levels are clearly less than the Pareto
eﬃcient one (= 1/β).
In the presence of peculiar benefits from social capital the equilibrium path of consumption
attained in the decentralized economy is given by (6). In this model the Pareto-eﬃcient
consumption cˆP is characterized by
cˆP =
1
β + λS <
1
β , (31)
λ˙− ρλ = − [γ + λ (n (1− c)− δ)] . (32)
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It is clear that the presence of peculiar benefits from social capital, i.e., a positive value of
γ, makes the Pareto-eﬃcient consumption level smaller compared to the previous one cP .
Since social capital is accumulated up to the satiated steady state level in the decentralized
economy when
n
n− δ ≥ β ≥
n− (γ/ρ)
n− δ , the long-run consumption level ends up being equal
to cDE = 1 − (δ/n); consequently, it may or may not be greater than the Pareto-eﬃcient
consumption level cˆP = 1/(β + λS).
To sum up, we have the following lemma:
Proposition 6 The long-run consumption level in the decentralized economy is greater than
the Pareto-eﬃcient one, while in the presence of peculiar preferences towards social capital the
long-run consumption level associated with the unique MPE strategy in the decentralized econ-
omy may or may not be larger than the Pareto-eﬃcient consumption level.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes a novel formal framework to model social capital as an aggregate state
variable that alleviates unsociable/sub-optimal behavior. By clarifying a concept that has
been the subject of ambiguity, our analysis yields novel insights and advances on existing
literature. To capture ineﬃciencies, the utility function exhibits a status motive (alternatively
known as ‘keeping up with the Joneses’) that induces zero-sum behavior. But status is only
an example of negative externalities; our framework is compatible with a broader set of
unsociable (i.e., ineﬃcient) behavior instead of status. In one version of our setup, we allow
for direct personal satisfaction from social capital. We use dynamic non-cooperative game
theory and model the formation of social capital as a Markov Nash equilibrium, allowing for
dynamic strategic considerations among forward-looking individuals.
The first message of this paper is that completely rational behavior inevitably leads to
the undesirable social capital poverty trap, because the negative externality arising from
status-seeking preferences is strong enough to oﬀset the positive externality arising from
social capital accumulation. Social capital has public good characteristics, so it is likely to
be underprovided because of incomplete collective internalization of the positive externality
inherent in its formation, which causes an intertemporal free-riding behavior. As a result,
the accumulation of social capital fails to deter ineﬃciently high consumption due to the
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status-seeking behavior. Thus, repeated social interaction may not be enough to resolve free-
rider problems and to deter opportunistic behavior; this is in sharp contrast to findings in
the literature on repeated games. Furthermore, the magnitude of the positive externality
generated by social capital accumulation plays a key role in determining whether the game
may be either a Prisoner’s Dilemma game or the Coordination game depending on how much
benefit from coordination accrues to each individual.
The second message is that, for higher stocks of social capital to become possible, we
have to enhance the attractiveness of social capital so as to dominate the negative externality
arising from status-seeking preferences. On the other hand, if the domain is strictly restricted
due to the existence of the satiated level of social capital, there may be a continuum of
MPE strategies. However, regardless of whether there are multiple or a continuum of MPE
strategies, in this case, our results indicate that zero social capital remains the only MPE
strategy. From policy a perspective, governments should provide incentives by enhancing the
direct utility flowing from social capital.
The model presented in this paper can be developed further in several directions. First,
the weight function put on status-seeking preferences could be relaxed to allow for a whole
domain of R+; for example, negative exponential functions. Under this extended setting,
it is questionable whether globally defined Markovian perfect equilibrium strategies may or
may not exist, because it is highly likely that they will ultimately pass the non-invertible
curve. Nevertheless, with help of Rowat’s patching method, it might be possible to define
globally defined strategies. Second, introducing asymmetric agents into the present model
would enable us to compare the results of the present model with those of the static conflict
model played by asymmetric agents. Such a model could allow for the emergence of the term
representing status-seeking preferences in equilibrium because the ratio between individual
consumption and average consumption is not equal to one and thus never vanishes even in
equilibrium. This may potentially allow for a variety of MPE strategies and richer outcomes.
Another interesting research agenda is to investigate non-Markovian equilibria supported
by history-dependent strategies such as trigger ones in the present model, which may also
support cooperative subgame perfect equilibria (see Benhabib and Radner, 1992). Fourth,
Putnam (2000) has made a distinction between bridging social capital in which bonds of con-
nectedness are formed across diverse social groups, and bonding social capital that cements
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only homogenous groups. The endogenous choices of individuals would be informative on
how much time they spend on enhancing closed networks, which contributes to the accumu-
lation of bonding social capital, and to the formation of open networks which contributes to
accumulation of bridging social capital.
Appendix A
Under the assumption of symmetry the first-order condition (6) becomes
1
c (S)
− β + 1
c (S)
(1− θS) n− 1
n
− V 0 (S)S = 0. (A.1)
Substituting (A.1) into (11) and further rearrangement yields
ρV 0 (S) = − 1
c (S)
(1− θS) n− 1
n
c0 (S) + V 00 (S) [Sn(1− c (S))− δS]
+V 0 (S)
£
n(1− c (S))− S(n− 1)c0 (S)− δ¤ ,
£ρ+ δ − n(1− c (S)) + S(n− 1)c0 (S)¤V 0 (S) + c0 (S)
c (S)
(1− θS) n− 1
n
=
V 00 (S) [Sn(1− c (S))− δS] . (A.2)
We once again diﬀerentiae (6) (i.e., V 0i (S) = 1ci(S)S
"
1− βci(S) + (1− θiS) Σ
n
j=1, j 6=icj(S)
C(S)
#
)
with respect to S and using Σnj=1, j 6=ic0j(S)C(S)− Σnj=1, j 6=icj(S)C 0(S) = 0 by symmetry, we
obtain
V 00(S) =
1
c(S)S
∙
−βc0(S)− θn− 1
n
−
µ
1− βc(S) + (1− θS) n− 1
n
¶µ
c0(S)
c(S)
+ S−1
¶¸
.
(A.3)
Substituting (A.1) and (A.3) into (A.2) yields
£ρ+ δ − n(1− c (S)) + S(n− 1)c0 (S)¤ 1
c(S)S
∙
1− βc (S) + (1− θS) n− 1
n
¸
=
+
c0 (S)
c (S)
(1− θS) n− 1
n
= (A.4)
1
c(S)S
∙
−βc0(S)− θn− 1
n
−
µ
1− βc(S) + (1− θS) n− 1
n
¶µ
c0(S)
c(S)
+ S−1
¶¸
·
[Sn(1− c (S))− δS] .
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Multiplying both sides by c(S)S and collecting the terms related to c0 (S) on the left-hand
side of (A.4) gives
c0 (S)
∙µ
S(n− 1) + Sn
c(S)
− Sn− δS
c(S)
¶µ
1− βc (S) + (1− θS) n− 1
n
¶
+S (1− θS) n− 1
n
+ β (Sn(1− c (S))− δS)
¸
=
− £(ρ+ δ − n(1− c (S))) + S−1 (Sn(1− c (S))− δS)¤ ∙1− βc (S) + (1− θS) n− 1
n
¸
−θn− 1
n
[Sn(1− c (S))− δS] .
After rearrangement„ we obtain
c0 (S)
∙
1
c(S)
((n− c(S))S − δS)
µ
1− βc (S) + (1− θS) n− 1
n
¶
+S (1− θS) n− 1
n
+ β (Sn(1− c (S))− δS)
¸
=
−ρ
∙
1− βc (S) + (1− θS) n− 1
n
¸
− θn− 1
n
[Sn(1− c (S))− δS] ,
which gives (12).
Appendix B The proof of Lemma 1
Proof. When all individuals play φ = 1, the HJB equation (5) becomes
ρV (S) = −β + V 0 (S) (−δS) . (B.1)
Integrating (B.1) yields
V (S) = −βρ +AS
− ρδ , (B.2)
where A is an arbitrary constant of integration. In follows from (B.2) that when A > 0,
lim
S→0V (S) = ∞. This unbounded limit, together with the fact that S(t) always converges
from any initial value of S ∈ [0,∞) to zero, contradicts the bounded above instantaneous
objective function in (1). On the other hand, the first-order condition (6) for the corner
solution φ (S) = 1 together with (B.2) yields
1− β + (1− θS) n− 1
n
> A
³
−ρδ
´
S−
ρ
δ , (B.3)
32
which implies that as S → 0, the right-hand side of (B.3) diverges toward plus infinity when
A < 0. As a result, A < 0 and φ(0) = 1 are contradictory. Taken together, the only candidate
with A = 0 remains as a possible candidate. In this case, the corner strategy φ (S) = 1 must
be consistent with (B.3); consequently,
1− β + (1− θS) n− 1
n
> 0,
which can be rewritten as follows:
S <
1
θ +
n(1− β)
θ(n− 1) <
1
θ ,
which completes the proof.
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